Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s visit to Vietnam reflects the growing criticality and strategic asset of Vietnam in the country and the region’s calculations. Hanoi now is seen as a regional leader in security and economic credentials.
It has been increasingly courted by the US and China, as both see its values and roles in expanding one’s pursuit in the region
Bilateral ties have been underpinned by the common strength and desire of economic interdependence and especially on critical resources and technologies. The 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations provides the path in deepening mutual trust and positive interdependence
Both are looking to bolster resilience and reliability in supply chain, food security, defence assurances and critical technologies of the future including semiconductor and green energy and digital economy.
Plan of Action 2021 – 2025 under the Strategic Partnership between Malaysia and Vietnam will be further developed, to provide greater spillover impact from deeper economic ties into people to people relationship and especially in security and defence spheres
This will promote high level engagements and exchanges in all levels, encompassing Track I and Track II diplomacy and societal appreciation in building trust and confidence and ties that are based on bilateral appreciation
Malaysia seeks to secure Hanoi’s assurances for food security, and Malaysia has its own advantage to offer in terms of critical resources and geostrategic advantage.Both countries seek to expand bilateral trade, striving towards the target of $18 billion by 2025, especially in new industries including the halal market
In 2022, Vietnam was the 12th-largest trading partner for Malaysia. Within ASEAN, Vietnam was Malaysia’s fourth-largest trading partner after Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand.
Major exports to Vietnam in 2022 include electronic products, chemicals, petroleum products, metal and machinery, equipment, and parts, while major imports from Vietnam were electronic products, iron and steel, chemical products, textiles, apparel and footwear, and agriculture.
Areas of renewable energy, education, creative industries, financial services, private healthcare services, tourism, digital and green economy and sustainable supply chain all provide new openings for both countries’ business communities and trading partners.
Vietnam has exponentially expanded its economic credentials and leadership in the region since joining ASEAN, being at the forefront of the regional supply chain. and market and among the biggest upcoming economic players in the world
Vietnam has quickly become a major export production hub for global manufacturers like South Korea’s LG and Samsung Electronics, suppliers to Apple, Inc. and auto makers like Honda and Toyota. This propels the country to one of the region and the world’s most prospective economic player that has implications on geostrategic calculations.
With China, it has a different historical trajectory, and has the added advantage and leverage over Beijing, with the edge in a moral victory and confidence after the brief conflict with China.
Vietnam in its 2019 Defense White Paper that it is ready to participate in security and defense cooperation mechanisms including security measures in the Indo-Pacific region – Vietnam sees the need to be part of this to increase its chips against China, and to seek greater support and deterrent capacity against Chinese actions and claims
Both countries share similar threat settings in the South China Sea, and have the compelling common drive to project a united front and a stronger joint deterrence against the bellicosity and grey zone tactics of Beijing in the disputed areas.
Both will also project greater joint economic and technological overdrive in critical industries that will have mutual returns, especially in industries that will determine the next frontier of regional and global geostrategic pursuit and power competition
Hanoi’s hard power capacity in the region and power postures in the South China Sea remain one of the strongest in the region, and has remain steadfast in its deterrence postures against Chinese moves
Malaysia remains behind in its approach and model in the South China Sea, and the response is lesser in direct power. Malaysia needs Vietnam’s strong hard power deterrence capacity in SCS and will need its support and counterbalancing efforts. It provides the strategic need to go beyond old disputes, and for greater urgency from both sides to supersede existing old disputes including the issues of illegal fishing and detainment of citizens.
This will provide greater trust and commitment by both sides to focus on the bigger looming shared threats and challenges in economic and security realms. If Vietnam can have breakthroughs and intent as shown in the EEZ agreement with Jakarta, new frontiers in the resolve of KL-Hanoi dispute must be resolved
There is a compelling strategic need to project greater united front and interoperability of security and defence assets and economic advantages, in areas of energy, green energy, digital economy, food security.
Technology transfer is critical in shoring up both countries’ competitiveness, as both remain the region’s primary players in the next frontier of economic destinations amidst the slowing of Beijing’s economic prospects and fundamentals .
Both remain among the top destinations in attracting the next spectrum of top investments and inflow of trade and critical technology and industries, with the growing exodus of top firms from China and the attractive and top comprehensive support factors for both Hanoi and Kuala Lumpur. This will create a spillover and ripple impact from economic integration and joint development into the spheres of defence and security.
A tripartite defence arrangement of Hanoi-KL-Manila remains potentially strategic, and Vietnam remains the emerging regional economic leader with more integrated military capacity
Vietnam is critical in geostrategic terms, as it is the only few remaining powers in continental Southeast Asia region that is not directly under the orbit of China.
Hanoi will also need Malaysia’s asset and advantage in key chokepoints in South China Sea and Strait of Malacca, and the path ahead remains critical for both nations to develop deeper defence and security cooperation and to have greater interoperability mechanisms and joint training avenues.
This will strengthen expanded strategic impact of related power postures, including in Nicobar Islands and Strait of Lombok and Strait of Sunda, and will need greater Malaysian leadership and role after the chairmanship of Laos in 2025
Malaysia and Vietnam share similar policy dilemmas in response to China, but Vietnam has better capacity in hard power deterrence and the level of dependence on the Chinese economy is lower than Malaysia. Vietnam has far greater chips and cards and bargaining leverage in using its expanded option capacity
Anwar’s visit coincides with U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s visit to Vietnam. Yellen’s visit cements the strategic intent to build a strong and credible second front and fallback support pillar in anticipation of shocks to the supply chain cycle, and Vietnam is now seen as not only critical in providing the magnitude of economic, investment and trade but increasingly in trust based security partnership. Hanoi features predominantly in Washington’s Free and Open Indo Pacific agenda in not only serving as a strategic counterbalancing deterrent force against Beijing, but as an emerging stabilising force in creating a chain reaction in blocking the overarching intent of Beijing in continental Southeast Asia and South Asia as a whole.
Sharing a critical border with China to its south, Vietnam holds the key in completing the full entrapment and containment circle of China in choking its efforts and options. With deeper Western presence in South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia, with ingrained security presence in East Asia, the West’s own counter strategy of power containment has been putting in more strains on Beijing’s expansionist intent.
The US remains Vietnam’s largest export market, critical areas of cooperation include green energy and economy, food security g and high end manufacturing.
Washington’s commitment to mobilise $15 billion to support Vietnam’s adoption of renewable energy as a part of the Just Energy Transition Partnership or JETP, reflects Washington’s ongoing commitment to stick to the value-based economic overtures approach.
Yellen’s visit is part of concerted efforts to halt Beijing’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, on top of Blinken’s visit early this year to mark the 50th anniversary of the U.S. troop withdrawal that marked the end of America’s military involvement in Vietnam.
Hanoi shares similar dilemma with Kuala Lumpur on economic and security ties with Beijing, and has always sought regional and bilateral efforts and intent to be seen as a responsible, matured and stabilizing force in disputes and conflicts
It has been instrumental and supportive in leading and creating efforts for a regional framework and platform in ensuring a stable, free and open regional sphere and Indo Pacific. It realizes that it has a unique position, influence and purpose in the regional framework of solving pressing issues including Myanmar and South China Sea.
Hanoi possesses both the carrot and stick advantage in projecting stronger returns in the disputed areas in South China Sea and to ASEAN’s collective position.
By Collins Chong Yew Keat, Foreign Affairs and Security Strategist, Universiti Malaya
