Kim Jong un’s meeting with Vladimir Putin remains a strategic win for the former, in capitalising on Putin’s vulnerability and in sending a message to both Beijing and the West. Jong un actually has more options and more leverage over Moscow and Beijing.
The global split over Ukraine and the bloc rivalry have emboldened Pyongyang, with Jong un finding a new voice and confidence amidst the new anti-West and anti-US bulwark, in which it can choose between Moscow or Beijing to latch up to.
Kim has always wanted to have a reliable fallback apart from depending on Xi. He is also cognisant of the fact that Pyongyang is critical for Beijing to maintain that vital buffer zone from the West, and Kim now has the leverage in offsetting Pyongyang’s predominant dependence on Beijing for food and economic aid.
For Putin to choose a different venue to host Kim with the pomp and splendour given in Vostochny instead of being held in Vladivostok on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum, shows the intent of Putin to honour and value Kim, and as a message to the West on the essence and perception of their ties.
Kim is cognisant that only Trump has the non-political baggage in changing tides and the recent moves are to force Biden’s hands and to shore up resilience in case of any escalatory moves from Biden before the potential comeback of Trump in 2024.It is to force his hands in toning down on the administration’s moves to continue the joint military drills with Seoul which continue to irritate Kim.
Although Kim was left red faced and deeply embarrassed by the second summit in Hanoi in 2019 with Trump that left him with no apparent deal to show, he still sees Trump as the only rational leader that has the distinctive intent and strategic will to make a historic deal. Since 2019, Kim has lost faith in leaning on the US to make overtures or changes in orientation.
Denuclearization negotiations have stalled and sanctions are not working. Jong Un knows that Biden is preoccupied with Beijing and Moscow, and sees Beijing as the single most existential threat. Now is the time for Jong un to seize the moment.
Putin intends to send a message to Beijing that Moscow still has options with Pyongyang, for arms support and that the no limits ties are not the be all and end all arrangement.
There are still wariness and future uncertainties, and Moscow dislikes being subservient to Beijing and continues to see Beijing as a potential future long term threat, underlined by past historical discord and a yo-yo trajectory in relations.
The risks of Beijing turning the table against Moscow is higher than Pyongyang. Putin’s offer of space assistance will provide Jong un with much needed push in his twice failed attempts to get a spy satellite into space this year.Putin wanted geopolitical clout and legitimacy in sending a defiant message to the West, more than weapons support alone.
Moscow can also rely on Pyongyang for a future conflict with Japan, especially over territorial claims and use Pyongyang as a leverage and as an added distractive capacity against both the West and potential additional combined weight of a new Asian Nato.
Putin is not really in a desperate need for Pyongyang’s weapons, knowing that putting these weapons to Ukraine war will only invite greater Western offensive and sanctions, but instead uses the meeting as a platform for greater long term alliance possibilities and fallback options, where Pyongyang is trusted more than Beijing.
The arms race is intensifying in Northeast Asia, led by both Tokyo and Pyongyang in upping their defensive and deterrence capacities .To Kim, for Washington to be steadfast in its strings attached demands of forcing Pyongyang to limit its weapons development and to give up its nuclear ambition amidst the new arms build-up by its neighbours, it will be both naïve and a reflection of Washington’s misplaced understanding and strategy.
Pyongyang still spends around 20%-30% of its GDP on its military expenditure, with rising weapons production rate and with an estimated stockpile of more than 100 nuclear warheads.
The visit to meet with Putin is also complementing its missile testing and launch strategy, which has gained steam this year, seeing how the Biden administration is getting back to the same old conventional hardline approach in handling Pyongyang with the usual precondition of complete denuclearisation.
Pyongyang has already fired 26 ballistic missiles and two space rockets so far this year. Last year, it fired more than 70 ballistic missiles, which remained a record.
There are nearly non existent money flows between Pyongyang and Moscow and trade remains near zero, according to estimates from Seoul. Pyongyang is heavily reliant on Beijing for its trade income, accounting for over 95%. The cosying up to Moscow is also meant to seek ways to diversify and as a long term leverage and second front option for its economic assurances.
Putin rolling out the red carpet for Kim further displeased Xi, as the latter has always wanted Kim to remain under its firm grip and obedience, with the predominant lifeline given to him. It is seen as a rogue move by Kim to choose Putin and Russia over Beijing as the first visit abroad in years.
Russia is resilient in terms of food security, with long term returns from its Siberian plank, and future trade advantages from its Northern Sea Route which will be crucial for Pyongyang.
However, Pyongyang can still rely on Beijing for food source, as a quid pro quo in giving Beijing security assurances in its eastern flank, through denying Western push and maintaining a buffer zone for Beijing.
In case of a Taiwan conflict, Beijing needs Pyongyang as a second front offensive power to distract the West and its containment force by using Pyongyang’s constant Achilles heel and its offensive capacity to threaten Seoul or Tokyo and by that, stretch the West’s capacity.
Washington must offer more than trying to sever dependence of Pyongyang to Moscow and Beijing alone to engage with Pyongyang. For Washington to ignore the right way to rein in Pyongyang as a direct threat or a threat to allies especially Seoul and Tokyo, or as a leverage to be used by Moscow and Beijing, will be at Washington’s own peril.
There is nothing substantial that the US can do to impose deterrence or costs to the Putin-Kim gestures, as current and future toothless sanctions are ineffective for both powers where they seem to have built an ingrained immunity and alternative fallback options to circumvent the implications of those sanctions without jeopardising their strategic intent and inner resilience.
In the current plateau of limbo and growing demise of tried and tested strategies of engagements in the past, Kim just had the opposite advantage than Xi, where the former now enjoys the privilege of time on his side, a growing momentum and greater fallback options with higher leverage and chips and cards in power plays and string-pulling than Xi.
The West will need new audacity in changing its playbook in dealing with Kim, as he now holds the ultimate card in helping Washington in both reining in Xi and Putin and creating the pinnacle of Western countermove in Indo Pacific by turning the Kim regime into its orbit which will effectively checkmate Beijing and in a large part, Moscow.
By Collins Chong, Foreign Affairs and Security Strategist, Universiti Malaya
