By Datuk Mohamad Fauzi Husin
RM3.4 billion in profit or RM1.4 billion in losses? There are questions that cannot simply be allowed to pass without scrutiny. When two reports on the financial position of a critical public institution produce vastly different figures, the people have every right to ask questions.
What Actually Happened?
In the case of Lembaga Tabung Haji (TH) for the 2017 financial year, one figure showed a net profit of around RM3.4 billion, while a financial review by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) indicated a position that should have resulted in a loss of around RM1.4 billion.
Now, following the release of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) report by the government on 29 July 2026, the questions have become even more serious.
The RCI found that had the Malaysian Financial Reporting Standards (MFRS) been fully applied, TH should have recorded a net loss of around RM1.4 billion in 2017, rather than the RM3.4 billion profit reported at the time.
This is no longer merely a political debate. It is a question of governance, transparency, accountability and public trust.
Two Reports, Two Different Figures, Why?
We need to be fair. The difference in the figures does not necessarily mean that someone had “lied” or that one report was deliberately fabricated.
Tan Sri Dr Madinah Mohamad, the former Auditor General, explained in a statement on 25 August 2026 that the difference between the RM3.4 billion and RM1.4 billion figures stemmed from differences in methodology, mandate, objectives and scope between the National Audit Department’s audit and PwC’s review.
That explanation is important.
However, it does not mean the public’s questions have been answered. Instead, it raises a bigger question: Why could different methods and standards produce such vastly different pictures of the financial position?
More importantly: What was the actual financial position known to the management and government when decisions relating to the hibah were made?
The RCI Has Provided A Clearer Picture
The RCI report did more than compare two figures. It found that TH’s financial position at the time was considerably weaker than what had been reported.
Among the matters highlighted were the failure to recognise impairment on several investments, issues concerning the fair value of property investments and the recognition of certain income.
The RCI also stated that the 2017 hibah was distributed without fully taking into account the impact of impairment and declines in investment values.
More concerningly, the RCI report stated that a deficit between TH’s assets and liabilities had existed since 2014.
This means the issue was not simply a one-year problem. It had a longer and deeper dimension.
The Real Question Is Not “Who Is Right?”
The public should not be forced to choose between the National Audit Department’s report or PwC’s report.
The more appropriate question is: What was the actual financial position of Tabung Haji at the time, based on the standards that should have been applied?
Now that the RCI has stated that TH should have recorded a RM1.4 billion loss if MFRS had been fully applied, the basis on which its 2017 financial position was reported becomes increasingly important.
The public has the right to know how the RM3.4 billion profit figure was arrived at. The public also has the right to know why the RM1.4 billion loss only emerged through a different review and assessment.
RM4.8 Billion Is Not A Small Number
The difference between a RM3.4 billion profit and a RM1.4 billion loss is approximately RM4.8 billion.
RM4.8 billion is not a small number.
It is not merely a statistical difference in a financial report. It raises fundamental questions about how the financial position of an institution entrusted with people’s savings was presented to stakeholders and the public.
TH is not an ordinary company. It manages the savings of people for a specific and highly sensitive purpose.
Trust is TH’s greatest asset.
When that trust is disrupted, the impact goes beyond the figures in a financial statement. It can affect the confidence of millions of depositors.
The Government Must Answer, Not Just Explain
In a situation such as this, the government should not simply say that the reports differed because of different methodologies.
That is part of the answer. But the public needs a more comprehensive explanation.
The government needs to explain:
- What was TH’s actual financial position at the end of 2017?
- Why did the financial statements show a RM3.4 billion profit when an assessment based on MFRS indicated a loss of around RM1.4 billion?
- Who was responsible for determining the accounting method used at the time?
- What information about TH’s actual financial position was known by its management, board of directors and the government when decisions relating to the hibah were made?
- Did depositors make financial decisions based on a picture of profitability that was later found not to fully reflect the actual position?
- Was follow-up action taken on the governance weaknesses identified by the RCI?
- What assurance is there that such a significant discrepancy will not happen again in the future?
Do Not Politicise It, But Do Not Silence It Either
This matter should not be turned into merely a political weapon.
Tabung Haji is too important to become a battleground for political conflict.
But for the same reason, it is also too important for the public to simply be asked to accept an explanation without being given the complete picture.
Criticism of the management of a public institution does not mean insulting the institution.
On the contrary, fact-based criticism is part of the effort to protect that institution.
We want Tabung Haji to be strong. We want TH to be trusted. We want depositors’ money to be managed with integrity, professionalism and transparency.
To achieve all of that, transparency cannot be optional.
The Question Is No Longer RM3.4 Billion Or RM1.4 Billion
Today, following the RCI’s findings, the discussion should not stop at the figures.
We need to look at what lies behind those figures.
What were the weaknesses in the system? What were the governance weaknesses? What happened within the decision-making process? Were there sufficient checks and balances?
Most importantly: Who should be held accountable when a public institution presents a financial picture that is eventually called into question?
This is what the government needs to answer to the people.
Not to find a scapegoat.
Not to seek political revenge.
But to ensure the same thing does not happen again.
The People Have The Right To Know
TH was built on the trust and confidence of people who share one objective: performing the Hajj in the Holy Land.
Depositors entrusted their money to TH because they believed it would be managed responsibly, professionally and transparently.
So when differences amounting to billions of ringgit emerge, the public has the right to ask questions.
Not because the public wants to punish anyone.
But because the public wants to understand.
Now that the RCI has stated that TH should have recorded a RM1.4 billion loss in 2017 had MFRS been fully applied, the issue can no longer be dismissed as an old matter that is no longer relevant.
It is a major lesson in how public money must be managed.
Conclusion
We should not be asking: “Which report do we choose to believe?”
We should be asking: “What is the truth that the people need to know?”
The government has a responsibility to provide a complete, clear and document-based answer.
Not merely a political answer.
Not merely a technical explanation.
But an answer capable of restoring public confidence.
Because when managing money entrusted by the people, the figures must be accurate, reports must be transparent, decisions must be accountable and public trust must be protected.
RM3.4 billion in profit or RM1.4 billion in losses is not merely a difference in figures.
It is a question of how an institution built on public trust presented the reality of its financial position and who ultimately has to answer to the people.
I deliberately wrote this article in a firm tone without accusing any specific individual because recent developments show that the issue is more complex than simply “two conflicting reports”.
The RCI itself has confirmed problems concerning financial reporting and the financial position, while the explanation from the former Auditor General has clarified why two different figures could emerge.
The government needs to explain how a RM4.8 billion difference could occur, who knew what at the time and what corrective action has since been taken.
The author is the President, Pertubuhan Integriti Dan Antirasuah (INTRAS) and Former Deputy Commissioner, Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC)
